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The emergence and prevalence of cooperative behavior within a group of selfish individuals remains
a puzzle for evolutionary game theory precisely because it conflicts directly with the central idea of
natural selection. Accordingly, in recent years, the search for an understanding of how cooperation
can be stimulated, even when it conflicts with individual interest, has intensified. We investigate
the emergence of cooperation in an age-structured evolutionary spatial game. In it, players age
with time and the payoff that they receive after each round depends on their age. We find that the
outcome of the game is strongly influenced by the type of distribution used to modify the payoffs
according to the age of each player. The results show that, under certain circumstances, cooperators
may not only survive but dominate the population.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative behavior is an ubiquitous and widespread
phenomenon that ranges from biological systems
to human societies. The reasons behind the emer-
gence, enhancement and maintenance of cooperation
remain one of the most important and interesting
puzzles in social dilemmas, because there usually is
a conflict of interest between what is good for the
individual and what is good for the population [1, 2].
The cooperative behavior manifested between selfish
and unrelated individuals are studied in the field of
evolutionary game theory, established by Smith and
Price in 1973 [3], that provides an appropriate theo-
retical framework to approach this still open problem.
A paradigmatic model frequently employed to investi-
gate the problem of cooperation in evolutionary game
theory is the prisoner’s dilemma game which was intro-
duced by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950 [4].
In the basic version of the prisoner’s dilemma
game, two players interact and they need to
choose between the two strategies of cooperate or
defect. If both defect (cooperate) they obtain the pun-
ishment P (the reward R). However, when a cooperator
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is confronted with a defector, the cooperator receives the
sucker’s payoff S while the defector gets the temptation
T . In general, these payoffs must satisfy the ranking
T > R > P ≥ S and 2R > T + S, which means that
defect is the best strategy from the individual point
of view while mutual cooperation may yield higher
collective benefit than mutual defection.
Since the original proposition of the prisoner’s
dilemma, several mechanisms capable of promoting coop-
erative behavior have received attention. It is worthwhile
to mention the seminal idea proposed by May and Nowak
in 1992 [5] which established a relationship between the
topological structure of the game and cooperative behav-
ior. Following this trend, several proposals have inves-
tigated the influence of the topological structure on the
evolution of cooperative behavior. For instance, games in
complex networks, such as random graphs, small-world
networks, scale-free networks and multilayer networks,
have been intensively studied [6–33]. Moreover, other
factors have been shown to influence the cooperative be-
havior (for example, reputation [34], voluntary partici-
pation [35, 36], social diversity [37], memory [38], mobile
agents [39–41], and many others).
In this work, we narrow our attention to the possibility
that agents get asymmetric payoffs based on some vari-
able according to which they differ [42]. In particular,
we would like to investigate a particular coevolutionary
process–aging–in the temporal evolution of populations
in evolutionary games. Although it can not be denied
that a population’s age structure influences its dynam-
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2ics [43], studies taking aging explicitly into account are
relatively few [44]. In particular, Szolnoki et al. [45]
investigated how different aging protocols can influence
the evolution of cooperation when agents learn as time
goes by. This is done by means of the introduction of an
age-dependent rescaling factor that influences the strat-
egy transfer capability. Apart from that, Wang et al.
[46] also investigated how the age structure of the popu-
lation can interfere in cooperative behavior. They stud-
ied an evolutionary spatial game in which cooperation
arises when the payoff correlates with the increasing age
of players. Both studies concluded that under certain
circumstances, cooperative behavior is enhanced and it
even may prevail over selfish behavior.
In the same year, Wang et al. [47] explored a variation
of these previous ideas. In this case, agents play on a
regular network and they can modify their strategies by
imitating one of their neighbors. This possibility is influ-
enced by the age of each neighbor and by a factor that
determines the extension of the effect in the model. The
study concluded that for a specific range of this parame-
ter, older agents are most often imitated and cooperative
behavior may prevail.
Despite these results, some aspects relating to how co-
operative behavior can emerge and be maintained in age-
structured games still need to be better understood. In
particular, the above-cited studies start from the premise
that the ability to transfer one’s strategy to other play-
ers and lead other agents increases with age. However,
in recent years, we have seen a significant change in the
paradigm of leadership in various social circles. Skills
that are developed with age have depreciated and new
skills, such as speech style, have been more valued and
have begun to characterize modern leaders. Agents of
any age are able to massively influence the population
and indicate how to dress, what to eat, how to act, etc.
A good illustration of this is present in Time magazine,
which annually publishes a list of the one hundred most
influential people in the world for the last year. The list
for 2018 is the youngest list of all time. In it, 45% are
under 40 years old and one of the personalities is only 14
years old [48]. Furthermore, Spisak’s work [49] showed
that in time of conflict, society prefers leaders who ap-
pear older. In times of peace, society prefers younger
leaders. It is also possible to observe this among groups
of primates where leadership does not always belong to
the elders [50? , 51].
Some research questions follow naturally from these
observations: how can this new leadership scenario be
replicated in the framework of evolutionary games? Can
agents of any age play a leadership role and propagate
their influences? How would this impact the evolution of
populations? Moreover, even in these previous studies,
all agents die when they reach a threshold age, which is
not biologically realistic. How would the emergence and
maintenance of cooperative behavior be affected by the
introduction of a more natural mechanism of birth/death
in game dynamics?
The purpose of this paper is to answer these important
questions. In particular, we use Monte Carlo simulations
to show that the strengthening of cooperative behavior
depends exclusively on the type of function used in build-
ing the age-preference of the game. The remainder of
this paper is structured as follows. In the next section,
we present the model. Section III is devoted to the pre-
sentation of the results. Lastly, we summarize the paper
and make some remarks.
II. THE MODEL
We consider the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma in a
standard parametrization: the highest payoff received by
a defector if playing against a cooperator represents the
temptation to defect 1 < T < 2, the punishment for
mutual defection is P = 0, the sucker’s payoff is S = 0
(weak version of prisoner’s dilemma) and the reward for
mutual cooperation is R = 1. Each player can be either
a defector (D) or a cooperator (C). Initially, there are an
equal number of both. The contact network is a regu-
lar square lattice. Each player interacts only with their
nearest neighbors and we use periodic boundary condi-
tions. The aging process is included as follows: at the be-
ginning, each player is assigned a random integer age Ai
between zero and an arbitrary maximum age Amax = 50.
At each Monte Carlo step (MCS), all ages are increased
by one. Players die with probability defined by a sigmoid
distribution:
δ(A) =
1
1 + α exp(−βA) , (1)
where α = 16000 and β = 0.1 are defined to ensure
that the average life expectancy is 75 years. There are
other ways of ensuring the same life expectancy. How-
ever, these ways do not produce the same distribution of
ages that we observe in a human population [52, 53].
When a player dies, their age is reset and they keep
their strategy, mimicking a birth-death process. At each
round (MCS), all agents play against all their nearest
neighbors, receiving the raw payoff pi (the sum of the
payoff resulting from the game with the 4 neighbors)
which is then rescaled by an age-dependent Gaussian
function:
Πi = pi
(
exp
(
− (Ai −Apriv)
2
2σ2
))
, (2)
where Apriv is the age at which the Gaussian function is
centered and σ is the width of the function.
In the model, the possibility for agents of any age to
exercise leadership corresponds to the free choice of the
parameter Apriv. Besides that, the use of a Gaussian dis-
tribution allows us to extend the rescaled payoff benefit
to a controlled group of individuals whose age is around
Apriv. The size of this group is determined by the pa-
rameter σ. The granting of benefits to individuals whose
3age is near to Apriv is based on empirical evidence of the
existence of an age similarity preference (ASP) in groups
of individuals that interact with a specific goal [54]. In
contrast, studies indicate that groups of individuals with
dissimilar experiences, beliefs, and values (as a result,
for example, of age differences) may have communica-
tion and social integration difficulties [55, 56]. Further-
more, if σ is small, Eq. 2 introduces asymmetry to the
game and some ages around Apriv are privileged. On the
other hand, if the value of σ is too large (σ → ∞), this
asymmetry is diminished because too many agents would
benefit by the rescaling process, such that the payoff dif-
ferences among the majority of players will become very
small and leadership will disappear.
Humans tend to imitate other humans recognized as
leaders [57, 58]. The model reproduces this possibility by
allowing each agent to update their strategy by copying
the behavior of another agent they played with in the
previous round. Accordingly, one of its four neighbors,
whose rescaled payoff is Πj , is selected at random. Then,
player i adopts the strategy φj from the selected player
j with the probability
W (φi → φj) = 1
1 + exp[(Πi −Πj)/K] , (3)
where 1/K is a measure of noise [59]. If Πi is equal to
Πj , the player adopts the strategy of its neighbor with a
50% chance. However, if Πj is bigger than Πi, imitation
is more probable. The only factor that determines if
imitation occurs is the difference between payoffs. That
is why equation (3) only took into account the rescaled
payoffs of the players. Obviously, if σ = 0 the game
becomes random because for all individuals Πi = 0 and
consequently Eq. (3) always returns 1/2.
Next, we present the results of Monte Carlo simula-
tions obtained for lattices with 1002 to 4002 agents. The
average fraction of cooperators (defectors) ρC (ρD) is the
number of cooperators (defectors) divided by total num-
ber of agents. Our results were obtained within the last
104 out of the total 2 · 105 MCS. Furthermore, the final
results were averaged over 40 independent runs for each
set of parameter values.
III. RESULTS
In Fig.1, we present the temporal evolution of the
density of cooperators, ρC(t), for several values of σ,
Apriv = 25 and T = 1.1 to help us understand the ef-
fect of using a Gaussian distribution to rescale the payoff
in promoting the cooperation. Initially, in all cases, the
average density of cooperators decreases quickly, which
happens because cooperators still are not organized in
compact clusters and they are easily invaded by defec-
tors. In fact, since the initial state is randomly chosen,
it is expected that defectors are more successful in the
beginning. Nevertheless, different values of σ result in
diverse trends at large times. On the one hand, if σ = 0,
all payoffs are rescaled to zero and the game becomes
a random movement between cooperation and defection.
On the other hand, if σ 6= 0, the outcome of the game
is strongly influenced by the values of σ. If σ = 5, a
very small fraction of the population is benefited by the
rescaling process of the payoff, and cooperator clusters
are not strong enough. Consequently, over time, the co-
operative population disappears. Similarly, for values of
σ that are too large (e.g., 30), cooperators do not survive
either, though they take a long time to die out. In this
case, a too large proportion of the population is bene-
fited by the rescaling process, the leaders disappear, and
consequently the clusters become smaller and more nu-
merous. For intermediate values of σ the initial decay of
cooperators is stopped and it is followed by a rapid spread
of cooperators, until they eventually cover the complete
domain of the population or until a stable equilibrium is
reached between cooperators and defectors, as shown for
σ = 10 and σ = 20. Nonetheless, for a given Apriv, there
is an optimal value for the distribution width (σ) that
enhances cooperative behavior, so that cooperators can
not only survive but dominate the population.
FIG. 1. Time evolution of the density of cooperators for dif-
ferent values of σ, T = 1.1, S = 0, and K = 0.1. Since the
initial state is random and the cooperators are not yet or-
ganized in compact groups, many of them are easy prey for
defectors and there always is an initial decrease in their num-
ber. For a given value of Apriv, values of sigma that are too
small (σ = 5) or too large (σ = 30) mean that, over time,
the population of cooperators will decrease and finally be ex-
tinguished. For intermediate values of σ (σ = 10 and 20),
the initial decay of the population occurs more slowly, which
is due to the greater resistance of cooperator clusters against
invasion. In these cases, they can coexist or even dominate
the population of defectors.
In Fig. 2 we show the steady state of the system
for Apriv = 25 (2(a)) and Apriv = 75 (2(b)) with dif-
ferent values of σ, temptation (T ) and sucker’s payoff
4(S). Moreover, we let TC denote the maximum value of
the temptation payoff where all players becomes cooper-
ators and we let TD denote the minimum value of temp-
tation where all players become defectors. As we can see
in Fig. 2(a), TC and TD depend on σ. For example, for
S = 0 when σ = 10, for TC = 1.13, TD = 1.16 and for
1.13 < T < 1.16 the system goes to a state of coexis-
tence between cooperators and defectors. Similarly, we
can see in Fig. 2(b) that TC and TD also change with
σ. These results strongly suggest that, for given Apriv,
there is an optimal σ that promotes cooperation.
The existence of an optimal σ for a given value of Apriv
becomes clearer in the phase diagram shown in Fig.3. In
Fig. 3(a), Apriv = 25 and in Fig. 3(b), Apriv = 75. The
green line represents TC(σ), which means that under this
line, independent of T and σ, the system goes to a full
cooperation state (C). The red line represents TD, which
means that above this line the system goes to a full de-
fection state (D). Between these lines, the system goes
to coexistence of cooperators and defectors (C+D). The
blue line represents the curve where TC = TD, which
means that it is impossible to observe the system in a
coexistence state. The transition between full cooper-
ation and full defection is not continuous. Our model
can be classified as a contact process (CP) which belongs
to the directed percolation universality class (DP). How-
ever, the DP class has a continuous transition. In 1974,
A. B. Harris [60] proposed that the universality class of
some systems can be changed by the presence of random
defects in the lattice. The Harris’s results are reproduced
in CP problems [61, 62] where some impurities are intro-
duced to the system. In Fig 3 we show that the change
in universality class only occurs for small values of σ.
We do not have introduced impurities or defects in our
system but, when σ is very small, the payoff is always
adjusted to roughly zero for individuals whose age is far
away from the Apriv. In our model, individuals with zero
payoffs, do not influence other individuals and act as a
defect in the lattice. The inset in Fig. 3(a) depicts the
exact point where TC 6= TD. This point is determined
by a finite size scaling method. The overall behavior of
these graphs is quite similar. The higher the privileged
age (Apriv, the age at which the Gaussian is centered)
is, the higher the optimal σ value that enhances cooper-
ative behavior is. This is due to the following fact: since
agents die according to a sigmoid distribution, fewer and
fewer agents remain alive as time goes by. Thus, for
older agents to be able to lead the way in the formation
of clusters of cooperators, the value of σ that optimizes
cooperative behavior is higher than when the privileged
age is younger. Nonetheless, for a given privileged age,
there must be a gradient of improvement that can neither
be too abrupt nor too smooth for cooperative behavior
to be enhanced.
FIG. 2. Asymptotic proportion of cooperators ρC as a func-
tion of the temptation T for different values of σ and S, with
K = 0.1 and with Apriv = 25 in (a) and Apriv = 75 in (b). As
expected, higher values of S facilitate the cooperation. For
small values of T , for each Apriv, cooperators dominate the
system and there is an optimum σ for which cooperation is
enhanced. It is justified by the use of a sigmoid distribution
(a biologically valid way) to determine the death in the game.
As Apriv increases, the optimal value for σ to promote the
cooperation needs to be higher because it becomes less and
less likely to encounter old agents.
5FIG. 3. Phase diagram T & σ. In (a), Apriv = 25 while in
(b), Apriv = 75. The red (green) line represents the critical
threshold above (below) which cooperators (defectors) go ex-
tinct. In the region between the lines, there is a coexistence
of strategies. The blue line corresponds to a first order tran-
sition between two absorvent states (full cooperation or full
defection). The optimal value of σ to promote cooperative
behavior depends on Apriv, as does the saturation value. As
Apriv increases, the graph is shifted to the right.
FIG. 4. (A) presents the maximum value of Temptation (T )
where the cooperators dominate the population as a func-
tion of Apriv. (B) presents the maximum value of σ wherein
the cooperators can dominate the population as a function of
Apriv. The behavior observed in both graphs are immediate
consequences of the use of a sigmoid distribution to simulate
the process of birth and death.
In Fig. 4 we show the graphs of Tmax & Apriv (a)
and σmax & Apriv (b). Tmax (σmax) is the maximum
value of T(σ) where the cooperators dominate the pop-
ulation. Since the tenacity of cooperative behavior de-
pends on the leadership exercised by agents whose age
is privileged (near Apriv), the behavior observed in Fig.
4(a) is due to the fact that the birth/death device is mod-
eled by a sigmoid function. For this reason, the payoff
rescheduling process becomes increasingly inefficient as
Apriv grows, especially when the Apriv exceeds 100 years
and the value of Tmax strongly decreases. Similarly, as
Apriv increases, the optimal Gaussian width (σ) must be
increased for the cooperators to maintain dominance over
the population for the same reason explained before, as
shown in Fig. 4(b).
Moreover, it is instructive to analyze typical spatial
configurations of cooperators and defectors for different
values of σ, as shown in Fig. 5 for T = 1.1, Apriv = 75
and K = 0.1. Cooperators are represented in green.
They tend to cluster in “islands” of cooperators to re-
sist “invasion” by defectors. These clusters are formed
around players whose age is in the neighborhood of
Apriv. If σ is not large enough, the players from the
edge of the cluster, who are necessarily much younger
(or older) than the leaders, are easily attracted to de-
fection because it is a more profitable behavior played
against defectors. This means that for small σ the clus-
tering strength is weak. Furthermore, if σ is too large,
all players have almost the same rescaling factor, and co-
operation loses to defection equally. On the other hand,
if σ presents an intermediate optimal value, cooperators
do not only survive but dominate the population.
Fig. 6 shows the number of clusters of cooperators
(NC) and σ for Apriv = 75. At σ = 15 all players are co-
operators (see figure 3(b)), so NC = 1 because all players
belong to the same cluster. As σ increases, the system
goes to a coexistence phase and NC grows as the defec-
tors invade the clusters. The number of clusters keeps
growing up to σ = 23 and after, decreases to NC = 0
because all players become defectors. The inset in Fig.
6 shows the mean size (number of players) of the clus-
ters versus σ. As defectors break the clusters, the size
decreases until it reaches zero.
Since the payoff rescaling affects all agents according
to their age, how does this process benefit cooperation?
Improving the payoff of some agents facilitates the for-
mation of clusters of players who share the same strategy
and are led by the players who benefit from the rescaling
process, both cooperators and defectors. But in the pris-
oner’s dilemma, mutual cooperation results in a bigger
payoff than mutual defection, which makes cooperator
clusters more stable than defector clusters when an op-
timum range of players, dependent on the age at which
the Gaussian distribution is centered, is benefited by the
process.
6FIG. 5. Lattice snapshots showing the clusters of cooperators
on a 4002 square lattice with S = 0, T = 1.1, Apriv = 75 and
K = 0.1 for σ = 20, 24, 28, and 32 after 105 MCS. The number
of clusters evidently decreases as σ increases after reaching its
optimal value.
FIG. 6. Stationary number of clusters of cooperators (NC)
for a 4002 lattice with S = 0, T = 1.1, Apriv = 75 andK = 0.1
as a function of σ. In the inset, the stationary average size
of clusters of cooperators also as a function of σ is shown.
There is a specific value for σ that maximizes the number of
clusters. In addition, the size of these clusters decreases as σ
increases.
IV. FINAL REMARKS
We considered an age-structured prisoner’s dilemma
game where the payoff is a function of age. In this game,
although the raw payoff for each agent is a consequence
of their strategy as well as the strategies of the other
agents with whom they interact, a Gaussian distribution
is used to modify the payoff obtained each round. In
this case, the age at which the Gaussian is centered
and its width are controllable parameters and simulate
the ability of agents of any age to exert leadership and
influence other agents to utilize the same strategy of
play. In addition, a sigmoid distribution is used in the
simulation of the birth and death process of the agents,
which makes the game more realistic and has a profound
influence on its outcome.
The results indicate that each privileged age in
the game (the age at which the Gaussian function is
centered) is associated with a range of widths in which
agents adopting cooperation as the strategy may not only
survive but dominate the population. As previously indi-
cated in the literature, the promotion and enhancement
of cooperative behavior are attributed to the formation
of clusters of cooperators, which allows cooperators to
resist the invasion of the defectors [45, 46]. This is
obviously a consequence of mutual cooperation being
more attractive than mutual betrayal in a PD game.
In fact, once the privileged age has been specified, if
the width of the Gaussian is smaller than a minimum
value, these clusters are not sufficiently robust and the
cooperator clusters are invaded by defectors. However,
if the width is larger than a maximum value, too many
agents are benefited, leadership disappears and the
number and the size of cooperator clusters decreases.
This dynamic is a consequence of the age structure
and the birth and death processes of the game.
Although these results help in understanding how age
can influence coevolutionary processes, there are still
some issues that need to be better understood, such as
how system dynamics are affected when more exotic dis-
tributions are used to implement the age improvement
or how these dynamics are modified when the interaction
topology is more realistically modeled through complex
networks.
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